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FOREWORD
Why business needs virtue
Barry Schwartz
EMERll'US PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY
SWARTHMORE COLLEGE
HAAS SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT BERKELEY

It has been almost 250 years since moral philosopher Adam Smith changed the
world. Though there were certainly transactions for profit before The Wealth of
Nations, Smith offered a comprehensive argument for the benefits that would
come from the free exchange of goods and services under conditions of compe
tition. Not only would such an arrangement increase wealth and well-being, but
it would do so in almost clockwork fashion, without having to rely on the good
will, honesty, communal purpose, righteousness or virtue of its participants. As
long as providers of goods were/free to compete and consumers were free to ,.
choose among providers, quality/ honesty, integrity and fairness would drive out
self-dealing, dishonesty and downright malevolence. As long as laborers we�e
free to offer their services, fair treatment of employees would drive out exploita
tion. A market system, under suitable conditions, would regulate itself. As Smith
famously said, "it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewc,:r, or the
baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest"
(Smith, 1776/1937, p. 119). Many years later, Smith's sentiment was echoed by
economist D. H. Robertson (1956), who asked "What does the economist econ
omize?" His answer: "The economist economizes on love."
Smith's point was not Hobbesian. He did not think that human beings were
the sorts of creatures who would ruthlessly exploit one another. Indeed, in
Smith's equally important, but less influential and less discussed Theory ef Moral
Sentiments, he argued that human.beings possessed a "natural sympathy" towards
one another that would serve to restrain them from doing their W?rst-keep
them from exploiting every possible advantage over others. But even so, how
wonderful to operate within a system that did not rely on such sympathy or on
any other virtues.
We look back on Smith from the perspective of the twenty-first century and
wonder how he could have been so wrong, so nai:ve. As companies scheme to
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defeat pollution-detection devices, price gouge for life-saving drugs, offer bogus
financial products and services, and charge fees for products and services that
people don't need and didn't ask for, we wonder how Smith could ever have
imagined that an economy could run itself. Economic historian Karl Polanyi
(1944) suggested that one misstep was in the separation of the economy from
the rest of life. People might be decent, as Smith asserted, with their families
and in their communities, but ruthless in the marketplace. Before the explosion
of free-market institutional structures, with economic activity integrated into
the rest of life, virtue in the home might carry over into the shop. But after the
industrial revolution, such carryover became less likely. "Natural sympathy" got
turned off when people crossed the threshold of their commercial worlds. In my
own work (Schwartz, 1986, 1994), I have suggested a different account. Smith
might have been right about human sympathy, but wrong to suppose that it was
"natural." Rather, it was the product of a rich institutional structure that taught
human beings how to be good people. Over time, I suggested, contact with
the market corroded the institutions that provided the constraints on our worst
impulses, with nothing left to replace them. So, on this view, Smith's mistake
was in taking a historical, contingent truth abput human beings to be a universal
characteristic of human nature. Since social scientists continue to make this mis.
/
take, even in the "enlightened" twenty-first ·century, we should, perhaps, forgive
Smith his myopia.
Whatever the source of Smith's "mistake," the promise of a self-regulating mar
ket comprised of citizens behaving honestly and honorably has not been met. What
has arisen over time is a complex web of regulations and rights designed to protect
people from the worst excesses of those with whom they do business. And beyond
the legal constraints on market behavior, there have also arisen efforts to define
what it means to do business ethically. Every business school teaches business ethics,
an implicit acknowledgement of two things, I believe: legal protection will always
be incomplete; and we can't count on people to do the right thing "naturally."
Into this territory comes Business Ethics: A Virtue Ethics and Common Good
Approach, co-authored and edited by Alejo Jose G. Sison, Ignacio Ferrero and
Gregorio Guitian, with various other scholars as authors or co-authors of indi
vidual chapters. The book covers all aspects of the business enterprise: leadership,
finance, marketing, production, governance, compliance and human resources,
with a chapter on each. What makes the book unusual is that instead of resting
its ethical principles on either a utilitarian or a deontological foundation, it relies
on a theory of virtue-or rather, several theories of virtue. Its central protagonist
is Aristotle, the progenitor of most virtue theories, but there is also substantial
attention paid to neo-Aristotelian Alasdair MacIntyre and to the Catholic Social
Teachings (CST). Each chapter gives us a picture of what Aristotle, MacIntyre
and CST might have to say about the topic, along with a detailed case that il
lustrates modern business practices, either at their best or at their worst. The
authors' beliefs, which they argue forcefully and convincingly, is that no set of
laws, deontological rules or utilitarian calculations can substitute for people who
do the right thing because it's the right thing.
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"Do the right thing" is a nice slogan, but it raises a big question. What exactly
is the "right thing"? It is easy to imagine a corporate CEO who believes that the
right thing is to maximize shareholder value. Such a person might be focused single
mindedly on maximizing value and regard ethical niceties like treating employees
fairly and treating customers/honesty as nuisances to be minimized or avoided all
together, unless they contribute to the bottom line. Aristotle's answer to this central
question was to emphasize the teleological nature of all human activity. The telos of
human life is excellence, and the form that excellence takes depends on the activities
in which it is pursued. The telos of the flute player is to be an excellent musician; the
telos of the soldier is to be a brave and cunning warrior; the telos of the farmer is to
produce a bountiful harvest, and so on. What then, is the telos of the financier? The
marketer? The production manager? What is excellence in these domains?
The gap between the world that Aristotle was writing about and the modern
world is so great that there is no easy way to bridge the gap. Thankfully, we don't
have to. Alasdair MacIntyre has done' it for us. Madntyre's After Virtue (1981) is
a tour de force of what I regard as neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy. It is an
attempt to apply key Aristotelian ideas about virtue to the modern world. I think
it wholly appropriate that Macintyre's work has such a prominent place in this
book. To me, his work is what gives Aristotle's ideas real teeth:_
Let's begin by noting the book's title. It is a remarkably revealing foreshad
owing of what is to come. What exactly does "after virtue" mean? It means two
different things. First, what, MacIntyre wa:nts to inquire, does the world look
like after virtue has disappeared, which he thinks it has in modern, liberal soci
eties. Yes, we still have virtue words in our languages, and we still use them in
everyday discourse, but the institutions and practices that gave them deep mean
ing in times past have largely disintegrated. Second, MacIntyre wants to know
_
how we can go after virtue, how we can pursue it. What changes in social life are
necessary in order for virtue, in its deep sense, to reappear?
Macintyre's answer to this·second question is that, in part, we may have to
return to the Aristotelian world in which excellence was defined wit� reference
to specific activities. Towards this end, MacIntyre introduces the notion of a
practice, which is:
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized
in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are
appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the
result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of
the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended.

(p. 175)

There are several things to note about this definition of a practice. Practices are
complex. They are social. They have standards of excellence that are peculiar to
them and partly define them. And they develop. The practice of playing basketball
is very different in 2017 than it was in 1957. Standards of excellence have changed
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dramatically. And importantly, those standards of excellence are established by
the practitioners themselves. You might say something like "I don't know much
about basketball but I know what I like." True enough, perhaps, but should the
practitioners-the players-care what you like? Should your likes influence the
path that the development of basketball takes? Decidedly, no. The people who
buy tickets to basketball games might enjoy slam dunks and fancy passes, but prac
titioners might well regard them both as mere decorations and ignore the prefer
ences of fans in pursuing the telos of basketball. The same can be said of artists. "I
don't know much about art, but I know what I like" may be true. And you may
even be entitled to your uninformed preferences. But why should the artist care?
Will the artist and the basketball player ignore the desires of patrons and
fans? To answer this question, we must introduce another idea from MacIntyre.
Practices depend for their existence on institutions. Artists need galleries, auc
tion houses and museums, and perhaps university programs in art appreciation.
Basketball players need leagues, arenas and paying customers so that they can
earn a livelihood. And importantly, what enables an institution to thrive-even
_to survive-may be quite different from what· enables a practice to flourish.
Without the support of fans, basketball players will have to work at other jobs
and develop their skills in their spare time., Without art patrons, artists will be
baristas who paint late into the night. Institutions make practices possible, and in
doing so, may require practitioners to compromise their standards of excellence.
A successful institution-one that is in good working order-will insulate prac
titioners from the daily pressure to' survive. They will support the telos of the
practice and protect the practitioners from the barbarians at the gate. But some
times, the practitioners will have to do their part to keep the institutions going.
And so, for MacIntyre, virtue is firmly embedded in and inextricable from
the activities and structures of daily life. The enemy of virtue is largely to be
found in the sacrifice of the practice-specific telos to return on investment, and
in the sacrifice of practice-supporting institutions to bureaucratic rule following.
Reconstructing our practices and institutions is the way to resurrect virtue. Simultaneously, virtue can be a guide to the shape that reconstructed practices take
and to the activities of the institutions that support them.
And now, I think we can see why the authors of this book believe that business
ethics should be virtue ethics. The marketers must ask, "what is marketing for? Is
it to maximize return or to serve human needs." The financiers must ask, "what
is financial engineering for? Is it to maximize profit, or to enable enterprises to
have the resources they need to conduct their business activities?" The banker
must similarly ask about the telos of banking, the production manager must ask
about the telos of industrial production, and so on. The various professions that
make up a business enterprise are each charged with defining the standards of ex
cellence that characterize those professions. The institutions (firms) that support
those professions are all charged with providing conditions that enable practition
ers to pursue this telos and avoid conditions that undermine it.

I
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Why virtue rather than rules? Two reasons, I think. First, rules require po
licing and enforcement. When people are willing to do whatever they can get
away with, enforcement becomes cumbersome, expensive and inefficient (their
lawyers an:: better paid and better trained than ours). But second, and more
important, rules are a blun� instrument when it comes to judging whether a
practice is on track and judging which compromises an institution can demand
of practitioners to assure the survival of both the institution and the practice.
Aristotle understood that rules were a poor substitute for judgment. In discuss
ing the virtues, he famously pointed out that virtue typically was located as the
mean between defective extremes. Courage, for example, is the mean between
cowardice and recklessness. But the "mean" is no arithmetic average. What is
courage in one situation might be recklessness in another. Aristotle thought that
what he called "practi�al wisdom" (phronesis) was what enabled us to find the
mean between the extremes. This has led my collaborator Kenneth Sharpe and
I to call practical wisdom the master 'vir.tue, the virtue without which none of
the other virtues is possible (Schwartz & Sharpe, 2011). Rules (laws) are what
you fall back on when people lack the skill (judgment) or the will (motivation)
to do the right thing without them. Reconstructing the language of virtue as
the hallmark of each of the professions on which business enterprises depend
spares us from having to depend on the ever-escalating arms race of rules, rule
evasion and more rules.
If not rules, then why not utility calculation. On this, I think, Aristotle would
be clear. Utility calculation requires a single metric-utility-that can be applied
across people, domains· of activit, and situations. It. demands a common standard
of excellence. It assumes trade-ofs, often between goods that seem quite distinct
(e.g., the productivity of an office worker on a proj"ect traded off against the "=-el
fare of the children .at home who need some time and attention). The idea that
every activity has its own telos resists the very notion that there is a single dimen
sion on which all things can be arrayed, assessed and compared. This is,not to say
that compromises will never have to be made. The financial arm of aj company
may decide that a high-risk financial move that violates the telos of its profession
is necessary if the company is to stay afloat. But, the fundamental incommensu
rability of goods makes trade-offs difficult and, in this way, protects the telos of
the individual practices from being corrupted by the needs other practices. In his
book Spheres ofjustice (1983), political philosopher Michael Walzer points out that
a single metric for evaluation creates a kind of tyranny. Walzer quotes the French
philosopher Blaise Pascal (1670/1961), who said:
There are different companies-the strong, the handsome, the intelligent, the
devout-and each man reigns in his own, not elsewhere. But sometimes they
meet, and the strong and the handsome fight for mastery-foolishly, for their
mastery is of different kinds. They misunderstand one another, and make the
mistake of each aiming at universal dominion. Nothing can win this, not even
strength, for it is powerless in the kingdom of the wise. ..
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Tyranny. The following statements therefore are false and tyrannical: "Be
cause I am handsome, so I should command respect." "I am strong, therefore
men should love me ...
Tyranny is the wish to attain by one means what can only be had by another.
(p. 96).
In sum, I believe that virtue ethics is just what business needs, and it especially
needs it now, at a time in history that is "after virtue." Introducing virtue ethics
to the business practices that surround us all may reinvigorate the language of
virtue by providing vivid illustrations of virtue in practice. Is such a transfor
mation of our moral language possible? MacIntyre was pretty pessimistic. But
philosopher Jeffrey Stout, in Ethics After Babel, took MacIntyre to task for failing
to notice the myriad small ways in everyday life in which the language of vir
tue was attached to virtuous practices. Stout discusses, for example, the efforts
paren�s routinely make to encourage their kids to have high aspirations but si
multaneously to be fair, show good sportsmanship and not cheat on the soccer
field. T here may, in short, still be a set of practices and institutions to use as the
_ raw materials to reconstruct a language of virtue and a set of virtuous practices
that foster businesses worthy not only of our patronage, but of our admiration.
Business Ethics: A Virtue Ethics and Common Good Approach will certainly help in
- '
that effort.
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